Abstract-Security vulnerability analysis of Integrated Circuits using conventional design-time validation and verification techniques is generally a computationally intensive task and incomplete by nature, under limited resources and time. To overcome this limitation, we propose a novel methodology based on model checking to formally analyze security vulnerabilities in sequential circuits considering side-channel parameters like propagation delay, switching and leakage power. In particular, we present a novel algorithm to efficiently partition the state-space into corresponding smaller state-spaces for faster security analysis of complex sequential circuits and thereby mitigating the associated state-space explosion due to their feedback loops. We analyze multiple ISCAS89 and trust-hub benchmarks to demonstrate the efficacy of our framework in identifying security vulnerabilities.
INTRODUCTION
The increasing trend of outsourcing fabrication and split manufacturing to untrusted foundries and manufacturing plants has imposed significant threats to the security of critical applications [1] . In Hardware Trojan (HT) insertion attacks, an IC design is covertly altered with a malicious intent at some point during the design or manufacturing process [2] . HTs, may lead to three types of security attacks: (1) leakage of confidential information (confidentiality attack); (2) modifying the specifications or functionality (integrity attack); and (3) reduced reliability, degraded performance and destruction of a complete IC or its module (availability attack), as shown in Fig. 1 . The effects can be catastrophic, such as system failure, and leakage of secret encryption keys, making it imperative to develop effective HT detection techniques, e.g., failure of ice-detection module in the P-8A Poseidon [3] , [4] ). Typically, HT detection techniques employ propagation delay [5] , [6] and power [7] , [8] , [9] signature based analyses, which inherently pose the following limitations: 1) These techniques are based on extensive simulations or testing on real hardware systems, which require immense amount of time, cost and resources (as shown in Fig.2 ), and therefore cannot provide full coverage for larger circuits. For example, in Fig. 2 , the circuit F (ISCAS S349) requires 51.2 seconds to test all input cases, i.e., 2 9 = 512 (because total number of inputs are "9"), but to analyze the security vulnerabilities for all the possible gates (349) and nodes (369), it requires almost 3.18 × 10 96 years and 3.64 × 10 102 years, if 10 tests are performed in second, respectively. Moreover, with an increase in the number of inputs, even security vulnerability analysis with respect to input patterns is not feasible. For example, it requires almost 109 years to perform the security vulnerability analysis for circuit H (ISCAS S349) with respect to all possible input patterns, i.e., 2 35 = 34, 359, 738, 368 (because total number of inputs are "35").
2) The measurements acquired through sensors cannot encompass all the possible input conditions for larger ICs because of inherent data loss during the quantization in analog-to-digital conversion [10] .
To address the above problem of high demand on the resources and the time of analysis during the design phase, different analytical techniques for vulnerability assessment against potential attacks have been developed. These techniques analyze the equivalent behavioral, functional and performance model against the design constraints and functionality characteristics [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] . These model-based simulations cannot guarantee complete coverage because of the computational constraints (energy and memory) [16] and floating point inaccuracies [17] . To address these issues, mathematical modeling and formal verification [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] , [24] , [25] , [26] , [27] , [28] , (i.e., SAT solvers and model checking), based approaches provides the completeness and accuracy to some extent. However, these techniques deploy symbolic execution or fixed approximation of side-channel parameters. Therefore, they are unable to incorporate the parametric behavior, especially, leakage power, and effects of process variations, which limits their scope to Active Hardware Trojans (AHTs, that remain active even under the normal operation).
Associated Research Challenges:
The aforementioned limitations of simulation-based, modelbased and formal verification-based techniques pose the following research challenges: 1) Accuracy: How to incorporate the parametric behavior and effects of process variations to ensure an accurate security vulnerability analysis, even in the presence of Stealthy Hardware Trojans (SHTs, that remain inactive until they receive any activation trigger)? 2) Completeness: How to ensure 100% coverage in security vulnerability analysis for all gates and nodes with all possible input patterns? 3) Feasibility: How to reduce the analysis time while keeping 100% coverage for all gates and nodes with all possible input patterns?
Our Novel Contribution
To address these research challenges, we propose a novel and generic framework for formal analysis of security vulnerabilities (ForASec, Section 4) to perform the security analysis while considering the complete coverage of parametric behavior (i.e., leakage power, dynamic power and propagation delay) and process variations. [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] [26], [27] [24]
[25] ForASec 3) A verification/analysis algorithm (Section 4.2) to address the state-space explosion while considering the uncertain behavior of side-channel parameters.
To evaluate the effectiveness of ForASec, we implement some of the basic sequential circuits and ISCAS89 benchmark in the presence of trust-hub Trojan benchmarks [29] , [30] , i.e., s35932-T100, s35932-T200, s35932-T300, s38417-T100, s38417-T200, s38417-T300, s38584-T100, s38584-T200 and s38584-T300. The experimental results demonstrate that ForASec is able to correctly identify the most vulnerable node(s) and the minimum-possible size of SHTs that can be detected while analyzing the leakage power. Moreover, it also reduces the analysis time by 5 to 20 times (See Section 5.3).
RELATED WORK
Typically, model based simulations are used for analyzing the security vulnerabilities [14] , [15] , but they cannot cover all possible test cases in complex systems because of their computational constraints (energy and memory) [16] and floating point inaccuracies [17] . To ensure the completeness and accuracy, mathematical modeling and formal verification based vulnerability analysis techniques have been proposed [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] , [24] , [25] , [26] , [27] , as shown in Table 1 . Although, to some extent, mathematical modeling can overcome above-mentioned limitations, it is still prone to human error and increases the design time. On the other hand, formal verification based approaches, i.e., SAT solving and model checking, can overcome the above stated limitations of simulation-based techniques by virtue of their inherent soundness and completeness [28] .
The SAT solver based approaches are used for multistage assertion-based verification, code coverage analysis, redundant circuit removal for isolation of suspicious signals and sequential automatic test pattern generations in vulnerability analysis [18] , [19] . However, they provide the information about the satisfaction of certain property but in case of failure they are unable to identify the reason, thus lack completeness in vulnerability analysis [31] .
On the other hand, functional [20] , [21] , [22] and behavioral [23] model checking based approaches provide the comprehensive vulnerability analysis and cover all possible input test cases but they inherently pose the state-space explosion problem for complex systems. To overcome this issue, several approaches for performance modeling have been proposed, which model the side-channel parameters, i.e., power [24] , [25] , [26] , propagation delay [25] , [26] and temperature [27] , and analyze the vulnerabilities based on temporal properties [25] , [26] , [27] and property specification language [24] . These approaches provide the symbolic execution or fixed approximation of side-channel parameters. Therefore, they only target the security vulnerabilities against Active Hardware Trojans and may not be able to analyze the security vulnerabilities due to Stealthy Hardware Trojans (SHT). These SHTs remain undetected and inactive during the testing phase and even after deployment using external, internal or time-based triggers, they can initiate any of the drastic payloads as mentioned in Fig. 3 . Symbolic sidechannel parameters of these approaches makes the translated model deterministic, thus overshadows the uncertain behavior due to process variations. Moreover, most of these approaches are focused on the cryptographic modules but other modules can also be affected to launch Denial-ofService attacks (DoS) or to disable the system. For instance, in Fig. 3 , the control signals of HT-1, 2, 4 and 5 can be used for DoS attacks, as a kill switch or for controlling the computation and communication. These attacks can activate their respective payload even if they are not directly affecting the cryptographic components.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we provide a brief overview of different triggering mechanisms and payload of HTs, gate-level modeling and model checking. Fig. 3 shows different types of triggering and payload mechanisms for hardware Trojans, e.g., the payload of HTs 1, 2, 4 and 5 is to hack the signals C and ER, which can be any control signal having the combinational, sequential (counter), asynchronous (counter) and hybrid triggering mechanism, respectively. However, payload of Trojan 3 is to leak the information via side-channel parameters which in this case is dynamic or leakage power. Therefore, HTs can broadly be categorized as: (1) Functional HTs, which change the system functionality by addition or deletion of modules with malicious intent and (2) Parametric HTs, which reduce reliability, increase the likelihood of system failure, and modify the physical parameters, such as power consumption and resulting in faster aging than expected. 
Triggers and Payloads of HTs

Model Checking and nuXmv
Model checking [32] is primarily used as a verification technique for reactive systems by translating them into a corresponding state-space model and temporal properties.
Although it provides automatic and exhaustive verification but in complex systems the state-space grows exponentially, which makes it computationally impossible to explore the entire state-space with limited resources. This problem, termed as state-space explosion, is usually resolved by using efficient algorithms and bounded model checking (BMC) [32] . In this paper, we use an open-source symbolic model checker, nuXmv [33] , supports rational number analysis and property language specification using computation tree and linear temporal logic, to facilitate the modeling and verification of designs that exhibit continuous behaviors.
Gate-Level Performance Parameters
In this paper, we employ the following multiple sidechannel parameters for gate level modeling of complex sequential circuits: Dynamic Power is the power dissipated while (dis)charging of load capacitances associated with transistors, nodes and wires and usually modeled as P switching = α.C total .V dd 2 .f , where α, f , V dd , C total are the switching activity, operating clock frequency, supply voltage, and the total capacitance that is (dis)charged in a transition, respectively.
Subthreshold Leakage Power is dissipated in an IC primarily due to the undesirable flow of subthreshold current in the channel from V dd to ground nodes, when transistors are in Off state. In this paper, we modeled it as P Leakage = V dd .I Leakage . Equation 1 shows the subthreshold leakage current of a MOSFET per transistor width, where W is gate width, L is the effective channel length, n is subthreshold slope factor, C ox is oxide capacitance, φ t = KT /q is thermal voltage, µ is effective carrier mobility, and σ is drain induced barrier lowering (DIBL) factor.
Propagation Delay is defined as the (dis)charging time of the internal parasitic and external load capacitances, it is estimated as Elmore delay based on individual input transitions t delay = ln 2 .τ elmore , where τ is equivalent to the firstorder time constant τ elmore = N k =1 R ik .C k , where C k is the capacitance at node k , and R ik is shared resistance among the paths from root to node k and leaf i .
FORASEC: ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK
ForASec analyzes the security vulnerabilities in a sequential circuit by translating it into its corresponding state-space model. Fig. 4 shows the different phases of vulnerability assessment in the proposed framework, which are explained below in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
State-Space Modeling and Translation
In the first phase, ForASec translates the circuits under test into their corresponding state-space and behavioral/functional/performance properties (see Fig. 4 ). For this translation, we developed the side-channel and technology parameters-based models for all the universal 2-input gates, i.e., NAND, NOR and NOT, that are used to model the multi-input complex gates and modules. For illustration purposes, we describe the two input NAND gate model with different parameter values based on their transistor level structure, shown in Fig. 5 . Dynamic power for 2-input NAND is modeled as
.f , where switching activity (α), is computed based on the input/output transition probability and the total capacitance at the output of NAND is equal to C total = C load + C diff . The load capacitance (C load ) at the output of a single gate is the sum of gate capacitances of individual gates connected at the output
C gnMOSj ). However, the gate capacitance for an individual pMOS/nMOS transistor is C gMOS = FO.WR.(C GSO + C GDO + W min .L.C ox ), where FO, WR, C GDO , C GSO , W min , L and C ox represent fanout, width ratio, overlap capacitances, minimum width, effective length, and oxide capacitance per unit area of the gate, respectively.
The internal diffusion capacitance (C dif f ) depends on both the sidewall perimeter PS and area AS of the source (drain) diffusion region and modeled as 
where C pdmin and C ndmin represent the minimum intrinsic capacitance for the pMOS and nMOS transistors, respectively. The minimum drain diffusion capacitance (C dmin ) for a single transistor is calculated as C dmin = AS .C jbd + PS .C jbsdw , where C jbd is the capacitance per unit area between body and bottom of the drain, and C jbsdw is the capacitance per unit length of the junction between body and side walls of the drain. Similarly, the minimum source diffusion capacitance (C smin ) can be computed as well.
We have modeled the propagation delay as Elmore's delay estimation because it considers the linear behavior of transistors to incorporate the effects of process variations. It is defined as the time required for charging and discharging the total capacitances via RC tree path from drain to source. This resistive behavior of the transistors is modeled as R on = L µ.Cox .W .(Vgs −V th ) . We have modeled the resistances for individual pMOS and nMOS transistors in accordance with the configuration of universal gates on different inputs. Table 3 indicates the Elmore delay relation for 6 possible transitions.
We have modeled the leakage current at the gate level using the components mentioned in Equation 1. The total leakage in an IC is the sum of leakage power of individual nMOS and pMOS transistors that are in the Off state, which essentially depends on the input vector. In CMOS based ICs, half of the total transistors are always in the Off state for any given vector. The stacking of two Off transistors in series significantly reduces the sub-threshold leakage compared to a single Off transistor. The two nMOS transistors in the NAND gate, shown in Fig. 5 , are in series and as a result of the stack effect on input vector 00, the total leakage current reduces by a factor 10
by virtue of Kirchhoff's current law. The leakage power for the two input NAND gates can be modeled with respect to the input states as shown in Table 2 .
In case of intrusion at the output of any gate, the total capacitance (C total ) of the gate can increase with the factor C int , which is the gate capacitance of the intruded gates (C int = C int1 + C int2 + ... + C intn ). Thus, the total capacitance C total at the output of the gate is changed to C total = C load + C diffusion + C int . This increase in capacitance can affect the overall performance of the gate in terms of side-channel parameters. For example, if the intruded Generate counterexample using Property II; 3: Add counterexample as an exception; 4: end while 5: while Property IV = TRUE do // upper bound of propagation delay 6: Generate counterexample using Property V; 7: Add counterexample as an exception; 8: end while 9: while Property VI = TRUE do // upper/lower bound of leakage power 10: Generate counterexample using Property VII; 11: Add counterexample as an exception; 12: end while gate is within the propagation path then it has a major effect on the propagation delay and dynamic power, otherwise its effect is more on switching and leakage power compared to propagation delay.
Verification and Vulnerability Analysis
In the second phase, ForASec verifies the translated model and intrudes it to analyze the vulnerable locations (see Fig. 4 ). First, the functional, behavior and performance tests are performed to ensure the correctness of the translated model. We assume that an attacker has access to the netlist, therefore, to model this behavior, a different number of intruded gates are applied at different locations in the model to generate counterexamples for the given functionality, behavior and performance. These counterexamples are used to analyze and identify the vulnerabilities for undesired behavior, caused due to malicious alterations.
We propose a generic set of functional, behavioral and performance properties, based on the circuit under test (CUT), to analyze the vulnerabilities against intrusions based on the performance bounds of the circuits, which are calculated by applying different distributions of technology parameters. It is important to note that the lower bounds for dynamic power and path delays are not considered because these values are always zero in the steady state condition. The above-mentioned bounds are computed under the following definitions: 1) The upper bound of dynamic power is modeled as n i=1 DP imax , where DP imax is the maximum dynamic power of an i th gate.
2) The upper bound of the delay of the k th path is modeled as m i=1 Delay imax , where Delay imax is the maximum delay of the i th gate in the selected path.
3) The upper/lower bound of leakage power is modeled as n i=1 LP imax /imin , where LP imax /imin is the maximum/minimum leakage power dissipated by the i th gate. Algorithm for Security Vulnerability Analysis: it analyzes the state-space model of the given circuit and generates the corresponding counterexamples using the set of 
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.φ t 2 .exp( linear temporal logical (LTL) properties. These properties are based on the upper and lower bound of side-channel parameters, like propagation delay, dynamic and leakage power. To capture the effect on dynamic power, we propose property I which states that there exists a state in which dynamic power is out of upper bound, which can be true if any intrusion has a significant impact on dynamic power. However, if the property is false then it indicates the scenario in which either there is no intrusion in the IC or the dynamic power fails to detect the HTs.
Once the unwanted behavior of intrusions is identified (Property I holds), we take the complement of Property I, to generate the error trace, as shown in Property II.
The counterexample driven analysis is performed to identify the vulnerable locations. After analyzing the counterexample, it is added as an exception in Property I to generate Property III. This process repeats until the Property I becomes false, as shown in line 1 to 4.
Similarly, this iterative process is applied on the following set of LTL properties to analyze effects on the propagation delay and leakage power. For complex and larger circuits, the number of variables in the model along with the individual gates increases, which augments the complexity, and thus the above-mentioned counterexample analysis may take a longer time. However, the proposed algorithm and the modular structure of gate models reduces the complexity by allowing to construct and analyze the dynamic power, leakage power and delay models separately.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
To illustrate the practicability and usefulness of our ForASec framework, we evaluate it on a set of ISCAS89 benchmarks and some basic sequential circuits, like D-Flipflop (DFF), Shift register and counter, with intruded gates (Table 4) and trust-hub Trojan benchmarks. The following tools are used for experimentation: 1) Yosys for gate level translation of provided netlist or verilog code [34] . 2) verilog2smv for gate level translation to corresponding smv mode [35] . 3) nuXmv Version 1.1.1 for model checking and performance analysis.
All the simulations are executed in Centos 7 on a computing machine with Core i7 processor @3.4 GHz and 16 GB memory. For each benchmark, we consider two cases: 1) Case 1: the malicious gates are inserted randomly along the IC paths at the input, output and within critical and non critical paths. 2) Case 2: the malicious gates are inserted parallel to the IC paths.
As an example, Table 4 shows the variations in leakage power caused by single gate intrusion in benchmark circuits. To analyze the multiple counterexamples that either can be generated by single or multiple intrusions, we used the iterative Algorithm 1. 
Modeling and Analysis of Benchmark Circuits
The ForASec analysis of the implemented circuits is performed in two steps: (1) accuracy analysis of model translation and (2) vulnerability analysis against multiple intrusions. The correctness of the translated model is ensured by verifying all the functional, behavioral and performance characteristics.
For example, in Fig. 7 , CLK-to-Q delay of a DFF is equivalent to the combined delay of NAND1 and NAND3, hold time of a DFF is equivalent to the inverters, delay and the setup time of DFF is equivalent to the combined delay of NAND3 and NAND4. Similarly, the dynamic power, functionality and other characteristics are well defined in the literature. Therefore, to ensure the accuracy of model translation, the translated model of DFF must fulfill all the above-mentioned properties, design constraints and characteristics. Similarly, we translated multiple ISCAS89 benchmarks along with basic sequential circuits, i.e., a DFF, shift registers and counters, into their respective SMV models and verified them based on the above-mentioned properties, design constraints and characteristics.
Security Vulnerability Analysis of Benchmark Circuits:
Once the accuracy is ensured, then vulnerability of the translated model is analyzed by applying effects of multiple intrusions. For instance, Fig. 7 shows multiple parallel intrusions in a DFF, which can affect the side-channel parameters due to the loading effect.
We evaluated basic sequential circuits and ISCAS89 benchmarks against single/multiple gate intrusions and trust-hub Trojan benchmarks, i.e., s35932-T100, s35932-T200, s35932-T300, s38417-T100, s38417-T200, s38417-T300, s38584-T100, s38584-T200 and s38584-T300. Due to space limitation, it is not possible to discuss the vulnerable point in all circuits, therefore, in this section, the analysis of DFF and ISCAS89 benchmarks, i.e., s349, s35932, s38417 and s35854, against single/multiple gate intrusions and trust-hub Trojan benchmarks, is presented as these are some the most complex circuits among the implemented ones. Table 5 shows the structural information of the implemented benchmarks. Fig. 7 . The feedback node in DFF is more vulnerable compared to other positions because of higher switching activity, which makes this node slightly unstable and lass vulnerable with respect to intrusion. Moreover, the change in the loading effect of the feedback node can cause the setup time violation, which may result in data corruption.
ISCAS89 benchmark S349 against gate intrusions
For the vulnerability analysis, we intruded the S349 at multiple locations with different size (the number of intruded gates). Fig. 8 shows the effects of intrusion on the sidechannel parameters but these variations can be overshadowed by the effects of process variations. Therefore, before intruding the circuits, we analyzed the effects of process variations, shown in Fig. 8 and analyzed their combined effects, which exhibit the following key observations: 1) The effect on dynamic power due to the process variations overshadows the effects of intrusions if the Trojan size is less than or equal to 7 gates (i.e., 2% of S349), as shown in Fig. 8 (a) (see label DP1). However, beyond that the effects of intrusions are dominant and varies at different locations. For example, the dynamic power is affected by almost 11%, when 10 gates are intruded within the critical path. However, it is affected by almost 5%, when 10 gates are intruded at the input locations. The reason behind this behavior is that, in S349, there are no DFFs at the input,but the intrusion at intermediate stages involves effects in the feedback path of DFF, which starts the unwanted switching activity. Similar behavior can be observed in case of parallel gate intrusion (see label DP2). 2) The effect on leakage power due to the process variations overshadows the effects of intrusions if the Trojan size is less than or equal to 9 gates (2.5% of S349), as shown in Fig. 8 (b) (see labels LP1 and LP2). The reason behind this behavior is that most of the physical parameters are affected by the process variations.
3) The effect on leakage power due to gate intrusions is very dominant, especially, when the intrusions are within the path, as shown in Fig. 8 (c) (see label PD1). However, if intrusions are in parallel then the effect remains within the range of the process variations till the intrusion size is 6, as shown in Fig. 8 (c) (see label PD2). As a consequence, it can be concluded that input nodes are the most vulnerable point in the sequential circuits because the effects of such intrusions can be overshadowed by process variations, except for DFF in which the most vulnerable points are feedback nodes. 
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PV/EC T100 T200 T300 T100, T200 and T300 have different triggering mechanisms and payloads for each benchmarks, i.e., S35932, S38417 and S35854. Fig. 9 . Effects of process variations (PV) on sode channel parameters, i.e., propagation delay, dynamic and Leakage power, on different ISCAS89 benchmarks in the presence of trust-hub benchmarks, i.e., s35932-T100, s35932-T200, s35932-T300, s38417-T100, s38417-T200, s38417-T300, s38584-T100, s38584-T200 and s38584-T300.
ISCAS89 benchmark against the trust-hub Trojan benchmarks
In order to evaluate the robustness and scalability of ForASec, we analyzed three of the most complicated IS-CAS89 benchmarks, i.e., s35932, s38417 and s38584, against the trust-hub benchmarks and identify their respective vulnerabilities that exhibits the following key observations.
1) Dynamic power analysis:
The effects of all Trojan benchmarks in s35932, are significant even in the presence of process variation, except s35932-T100, as shown in Fig. 9 (See label 1). Similarly, the Trojan benchmarks for s35854, the of Trojan benchmarks s38584-T200 and s38584-T300 are overshadowed by the effects of process variations, as shown in Fig. 9 (See label 2). The reason behind this behavior is that, these Trojans operate in parallel and do not change the activity on any node of the circuit. Thus, s35932-T100, s38584-T200 and s38584-T300 can be considered as powerful attacks for dynamic power-based detection schemes. 2) Leakage power analysis: Almost all the Trojan benchmarks have a significant impact on the leakage power, except s35932-T200, as shown in Fig. 9 (See label 3) . The reason behind this behavior is that the size of this Trojan is very small (15 gates, 0.04% of s35932). However, when it gets activated, it increases the switching activity and reduces the delay by creating a parallel path to skip four gates. Therefore, it has a significant impact on the dynamic power and the propagation delay, as shown in Fig. 9 . In short, this Trojan (s35932-T200), can be considered as the powerful attack for leakage powerbased detection schemes. 3) Propagation delay analysis: Process variations overshadow the effects of almost all the Trojans, as shown in Fig. 9 (See labels 4 and 5). The reason behind this behavior is that all these Trojans are inserted in parallel to the computational paths. However, s35932-T200 and S38417-T200 exhibit significant impact on propagation delay. In short, these Trojans (s35932-T200 and S38417-T200) are the weak attacks for propagation delay-based detection schemes.
Performance Analysis
Algorithm 1 generates a number of counterexamples during the vulnerability analysis of an IC depending upon intruded gates, their size and locations. Moreover, the time required by the nuXmv model checker to generate a single counterexample depends on the number of gates in an IC, i.e., size of the state-space model. Table 6 shows the number of counterexamples (CE), their analysis time (T) in seconds (s), and memory (M) acquired in gigabytes (GB) for the 8 NAND gates intrusion (within a computational path) in the ISCAS89 benchmark S349. It shows that with our proposed algorithm, the analysis time and required memory is exponentially reduced.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel formal framework (ForASec), based on the side-channel parameter analysis, (T(s) ) and required Memory(M(GB)) for 8 gates intrusion (with computational path) in S349, ISCAS89 benchmark
